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Specificity of Action Representations in the Lateral Occipitotemporal Cortex
Abstract
The ability to recognize actions is important for cognitive development and social cognition. Areas in the
lateral occipitotemporal cortex show increased activity when subjects view action sequences; however,
whether this activity distinguishes between specific actions as necessary for action recognition is
unclear. We used a functional magnetic resonance imaging adaptation paradigm to test for brain regions
that exhibit action-specific activity. Subjects watched a series of action sequences in which the action
performed or the person performing the action could be repeated from a previous scan. Three
regions—the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), human motion-sensitive cortex (MT/MST), and extrastriate
body area (EBA)—showed decreased activity for previously seen actions, even when the actions were
novel exemplars because the persons involved had not been seen previously. These action-specific
adaptation effects provide compelling evidence that representations in the pSTS, MT/MST, and EBA
abstract actions from the agents involved and distinguish between different particular actions.
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Specificity of Action Representations in the Lateral
Occipitotemporal Cortex
Joseph W. Kable* and Anjan Chatterjee

Abstract
& The ability to recognize actions is important for cognitive
development and social cognition. Areas in the lateral occipitotemporal cortex show increased activity when subjects view
action sequences; however, whether this activity distinguishes
between specific actions as necessary for action recognition
is unclear. We used a functional magnetic resonance imaging
adaptation paradigm to test for brain regions that exhibit actionspecific activity. Subjects watched a series of action sequences
in which the action performed or the person performing the

INTRODUCTION
A prominent theory of cortical organization divides
higher level visual areas into a dorsal processing stream
(involving occipitoparietal areas) that is important for
visual control of motor behavior and a ventral processing stream (involving occipitotemporal areas) that
is important for visual recognition and identification
(Goodale & Milner, 1992). Most of the work establishing
the ventral stream’s role in visual recognition has focused on the recognition of objects. For example,
functional imaging studies have identified areas within
the ventral stream that respond preferentially to different categories of objects (Hasson, Harel, Levy, &
Malach, 2003; Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998; Kanwisher,
McDermott, & Chun, 1997), and neuropsychological investigations have demonstrated that damage to ventral
occipitotemporal areas impairs the ability to recognize
objects (Ferreira, Ceccaldi, Giusiano, & Poncet, 1998;
Schwartz, Barrett, Crucian, & Heilman, 1998; Goodale &
Milner, 1992). However, humans can recognize classes
of visual stimuli other than objects, such as actions, and
deficits in action and object recognition can dissociate
after brain damage (Ferreira et al., 1998; Schwartz et al.,
1998; Rothi, Mack, & Heilman, 1986). In particular,
damage to ventral occipitotemporal areas can impair
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action could be repeated from a previous scan. Three regions—
the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), human motion-sensitive
cortex (MT/MST), and extrastriate body area (EBA)—showed decreased activity for previously seen actions, even when the actions were novel exemplars because the persons involved had
not been seen previously. These action-specific adaptation effects
provide compelling evidence that representations in the pSTS,
MT/MST, and EBA abstract actions from the agents involved and
distinguish between different particular actions. &

object recognition while leaving action recognition intact. Given the critical role that action recognition plays
in cognitive development and social cognition, it is
important to understand the neural mechanisms of
action recognition and how these might differ from
those of object recognition.
One prominent hypothesis is that the understanding
of actions is ‘‘embodied.’’ According to this view, the
recognition of actions depends on mirror neurons within frontal and parietal cortices, which are active both
when an individual engages in a certain action and when
that individual sees the same action (Rizzolatti, Fogassi,
& Gallese, 2001). However, this view cannot completely
account for action recognition because individuals can
recognize actions that they cannot perform themselves.
For example, an inability to swim does not prevent
one from being able to recognize someone else swimming. In addition, some action events, such as ‘‘swarming bees,’’ can be recognized although these actions
cannot in principle be embodied in human motor systems. Finally, even for the view that action recognition
is instantiated in mirror neurons, the question remains
open as to whether the source of visual information for
these circuits is sufficient in and of itself to recognize
actions.
Several recent functional imaging studies have investigated the neural mechanisms of action recognition by
comparing brain responses to action movies depicting
moving human bodies to stationary pictures of human
bodies or other objects (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Allison,
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Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Decety & Grezes, 1999). These
studies generally find activation in a distributed network that includes lateral occipitotemporal, inferior
parietal, and inferior prefrontal areas. The inferior parietal and prefrontal activations are consistent with
the ‘‘embodied’’ hypothesis of action recognition. Furthermore, inferior prefrontal activity only occurs when
the actions belong to the motor repertoire of the
observer, whereas lateral occipitotemporal activity occurs whether or not the actions can be embodied by
the observer (Buccino et al., 2004). This finding suggests that prefrontal and parietal cortices are involved
in the recognition of actions through mirror neuron
circuits, whereas the lateral occipitotemporal cortex is
involved in the recognition of actions based on visual
information alone. However, the exact role of the lateral occipitotemporal region remains unclear. Areas in
the superior temporal sulcus are sensitive to biological motion (Grossman et al., 2000; Bonda, Petrides,
Ostry, & Evans, 1996; Howard et al., 1996), and more
posterior lateral occipital areas are sensitive to motion
generally (Tootell et al., 1995) or to the human form
(Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001). Thus,
in comparing action movies and stationary images,
greater activity in lateral occipitotemporal areas could
be explained simply by the presence of different kinds
of motion or of the human form, rather than the processing of actions per se. If these areas are truly involved
in action recognition, then activity patterns in these
regions should be action-specific—abstracting actions
from the agents involved and distinguishing between
different actions.
To investigate whether the lateral occipitotemporal
cortex exhibits action-specific activity, we took advantage of the observation that repeated stimuli, compared
to completely novel stimuli, are generally associated
with decreased functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) activity in areas processing these stimuli (Henson,
2003; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001; Schacter & Buckner,
1998; Wiggs & Martin, 1998). These repetition-related
decreases, often referred to as neural adaptation effects, are observed with stimuli repeated immediately
or after delays ranging from minutes to days. Although
the precise neuronal mechanisms underlying adaptation effects are still a matter of ongoing investigation
(Henson, 2003; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001; Wiggs &
Martin, 1998), some investigators have recently shown
that adaptation seen with immediate (Epstein, Graham,
& Downing, 2003; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; GrillSpector et al., 1999) and delayed (Dobbins, Schnyer,
Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2004; James, Humphrey, Gati,
Menon, & Goodale, 2002; Vuilleumier, Henson, Driver,
& Dolan, 2002; Koutstaal et al., 2001) repetitions can
be used to probe how different brain areas process
specific aspects of stimuli. In addition to repeated and
novel stimuli, these investigators also presented stimuli that were similar on one dimension while differing on

another, compared to those seen previously. An adaptation effect for this condition then provided evidence
that activity in an area was sensitive to the shared dimension and was not sensitive to the changed dimension.
In the present study, we used neural adaptation to
dissociate responses specific to the action from responses to other components of action stimuli. During
scanning, subjects watched short (2 sec) action movies
while performing a speeded judgment about each movie
that focused their attention on the actions depicted. In
the critical scans, subjects saw four kinds of movies presented in a rapid, event-related fashion (see Figure 1):
(1) the exact same movies they had seen in previous
scans, (2) movies of people they had seen previously
performing new actions, (3) movies of new people
performing actions they had seen previously, and (4)
movies in which both the people and the actions were
new. We expected that many areas would show adaptation for repeated presentations of the exact same movies
compared to completely novel movies (repetition adaptation: Old Person, Old Action < New Person, New
Action). However, areas specifically involved in processing actions should also show adaptation for movies
of previously seen actions performed by new people
(action-specific adaptation: New Person, Old Action <
New Person, New Action). Such action-specific adaptation implies that an area is sensitive to the particular
action presented because only action identity differentiates the two conditions. Such an effect also demonstrates that activity in an area generalizes over different
exemplars of the same action. Thus, action-specific
adaptation would provide strong evidence that an area
participates in action recognition and could not be explained by differences in the complexity of the stimuli,
such as the presence of motion (biological or not) or
the human form.
With these considerations in mind, we focused our
analyses on the three functionally identified regions of
interest (ROIs) on the lateral occipitotemporal surface
(see Figure 2): a region in the superior temporal sulcus responsive to biological motion (pSTS) (Grossman
et al., 2000; Bonda et al., 1996; Howard et al., 1996),
the human homolog of motion-sensitive regions in the
macaque (MT/MST) (Tootell et al., 1995), and a recently
identified region near MT/MST that selectively responds
to pictures of human bodies (extrastriate body area
[EBA]) (Downing et al., 2001). Finding action-specific
adaptation in any of these areas would establish that
activity there distinguishes between particular actions
and generalizes over different exemplars of the same
action, a sensitivity that goes beyond the established
responses in these three regions to the presence of
different kinds of motion or of the human form. For a
control comparison, we also tested two object-selective
regions in the ventral occipitotemporal cortex, the fusiform face area (FFA) (Kanwisher et al., 1997) and parahippocampal place area (PPA) (Epstein & Kanwisher,
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Figure 1. Action sequence
stimuli and adaptation
conditions. Single frames from
action movie sequences used
in the experiment are shown
to illustrate the various
adaptation conditions. (Top)
During the first three scans,
subjects saw the same set of
movies repeated five times.
(Bottom) During the last two
scans, subjects saw (1) the
exact same movies they had
seen in previous scans (Old
Person, Old Action), (2)
movies of people they had
seen previously performing
new actions (Old Person,
New Action), (3) movies of
new people performing
actions they had seen
previously (New Person, Old
Action), and (4) movies in
which both the people and
the actions were new (New
Person, New Action).

1998), as well as an object-selective region that is
part of the lateral occipital (LO) complex (Hasson et al.,
2003). Finally, to detect any effects that might occur
outside of these functionally defined regions, we also
performed a whole-brain analysis.

symptoms. All subjects gave informed consent in accordance with the procedures of the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Pennsylvania.

Experimental Design and Stimuli

METHODS
Subjects
Nine paid volunteers participated in the experiment (five
women, four men; mean age = 23 years). All subjects
were right-handed and spoke only English before school
age. None had a history of neurological or psychiatric
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Each subject participated in at least eight functional
scans. During the first five scans, subjects watched
movies (2 sec in length, 30 frames/sec) in which a single
person performed a recognizable action. In the first
three scans, the subject was preexposed to a single set
of 32 movies. During the first scan, these movies were
presented in a sparse, event-related manner (one movie
every 17 sec). This scan was used to estimate the in-
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Figure 2. Stimulus sets and counterbalancing procedures. To ensure that any differences across adaptation conditions could not be
attributed to idiosyncratic features of particular movies, the stimuli were precisely counterbalanced so that each movie appeared once
in each of the four adaptation conditions across nine subjects. A single set of 32 movies is shown at the left. Each column represents a
different action and each row represents a different person. Gray boxes indicate the action–person combinations used in this set. Within
each set, each action or person appeared in two movies, so that a total of 16 different actions and 16 different people were represented
in a single set. The complete stimulus set is shown in the center, which consisted of 288 different movies, composed of a combination of
48 actions and 48 people, divided into nine sets of 32 movies. The sets used in each of the four adaptation conditions for one subject are
labeled in the center and shown schematically for all nine subjects at the right. OPOA = Old Person, Old Action; NPOA = New Person,
Old Action; OPNA = Old Person, New Action; NPNA = New Person, New Action.

trinsic temporal autocorrelation for each subject, as well
as a subject- and task-specific hemodynamic response
function. During the second and third scans, the same
set of movies was presented in a rapid event-related
manner, with each movie being presented four times.
Movies were presented every 4 sec, and presentations
were jittered by interspersing 4-sec blank periods. Then,
during the critical fourth and fifth scans, four sets of
movies were presented in a rapid, event-related manner (see Figure 1): (1) the same set of movies used in
the first three scans (‘‘Old Person, Old Action’’), (2) a
set of movies with the same people seen in the first
three scans performing new actions (‘‘Old Person, New
Action’’), (3) a set of movies with new people performing the same actions seen in the first three scans
(‘‘New Person, Old Action’’), and (4) a set of movies in
which both the people and the actions were new (‘‘New
Person, New Action’’).
Thus, each subject saw a total of 128 different movies
from four different sets of 32 movies. The complete
stimulus set and counterbalancing procedures are described in Figure 2, and a complete list of the actions
used is provided in the Appendix. Each set of movies

contained equal numbers of common (typically seen at
least once a week) and uncommon actions, equal numbers of transitive (involved the use of an object) and
intransitive actions, and equal numbers of male and female actors. Critically, across nine subjects, nine sets of
movies were perfectly counterbalanced so that each set
appeared once in each of the four different conditions.
This counterbalancing ensured that any differences between the four conditions could not be attributed to
idiosyncratic features of particular movies.
Subjects performed a speeded judgment for each
movie, deciding whether the action in the movie was
common (observed at least once a week) or not. Subjects were allowed a 2-sec time window to make their
judgment. Because our primary motivation was to identify the neural mediation of action representations, we
chose a task that (1) ensured that subjects attended to
the action in the movie clip and (2) was applicable to a
variety of different actions. Subjects’ reaction times for
this speeded judgment also provided a behavioral measure sensitive to their efficiency at action recognition,
allowing us to investigate the relationship between behavioral priming and neural adaptation.
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Because the common/uncommon judgment was inherently subjective (e.g., athletes might see someone
kicking a ball at least once a week, whereas nonathletes
might not), we did not classify subjects’ responses as
correct or incorrect. In lieu of accuracy, however, we
calculated two measures based on subjects’ responses
that indicated how reliably they performed the task.
First, we calculated how often subjects’ responses agreed
with the typical response for each action. The typical
response for each action was determined by a rating
study we performed before constructing the stimulus
set, in which 15 subjects rated a larger list of actions as
common or uncommon. For all of the actions used in
the current experiment, at least two thirds of these subjects (10 of 15) agreed on a common/uncommon designation, with the mean agreement being 86 ± 2%
(13 of 15 subjects). Second, as described in Figure 2,
the same action appears twice in each set of 32 movies.
This allowed us to determine whether subjects made
consistent responses by calculating how often subjects’
made the same response for both exemplars of an action
within a set.
After the first five scans, subjects also participated in
localizer scans to functionally identify six ROIs (see
Figure 3). To identify visual areas showing categoryspecific responses (FFA, PPA, LO, EBA), subjects participated in two scans during which they viewed 18-sec
blocks of pictures from the following categories: natural
landscapes (‘‘places’’), faces, objects, body parts (heads

or faces not shown), and object pictures that had been
scrambled. Each picture was presented for 400 msec
with a 500-msec interstimulus interval. Subjects monitored the pictures for immediate repetitions, which
occurred twice in each block.
Subjects participated in a single scan to identify the
biological motion area in the superior temporal sulcus
(pSTS) and the MT/MST complex. Subjects were shown
18-sec blocks of the following: ‘‘point-light’’ movies that
were perceived as human movements (walking, jumping, kicking, etc.); movies of dots with the same motion
vectors but with scrambled starting positions, so that
no human form or movement was perceived; and stationary dots, taken from the first frame of the scrambled
movies. Each movie was 1 sec in length (20 frames/sec),
with a 2-sec interstimulus interval. Subjects were again
monitored for immediate repetitions, which occurred
once per block.

Data Acquisition
Data were acquired on a 3.0-T Siemens Trio scanner
using a USA Instruments four-channel head coil. Blood
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)-sensitive, T2*weighted functional images were acquired in 3-mm isotropic voxels using a gradient-echo, echoplanar pulse
sequence (TR = 3000 msec, TEeff = 30 msec). Forty
3-mm slices were acquired during each repetition, with

Figure 3. Functional ROIs.
The locations of the six
functionally identified ROIs
are shown for one subject
from the experiment. PPA =
parahippocampal place area;
FFA = fusiform face area, LO =
lateral occipital object-selective
area; EBA = extrastriate body
area; MT/MST = human
motion-sensitive cortex or V5,
pSTS = superior temporal
sulcus biological motion area.
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each slice containing a 64  64 matrix within a 192 
192-mm field of view. Head motion was minimized by
using foam padding, and the scanner performed both
prospective (3-D prospective acquisition correction
[PACE]) and retrospective motion correction online.
The number of images collected during each functional
scan varied from 120 to 194, with the length of each
scan thus varying from 6 min to 9 min 42 sec. The first
six images of each functional scan were discarded to
allow for steady-state magnetization to be achieved.
High-resolution, T1-weighted anatomical images were
also acquired for each subject by using an MPRAGE
pulse sequence (TR = 1620 msec, TE = 3 msec, TI =
950 msec). One hundred sixty 1-mm slices were acquired, with each slice containing a 256  256 matrix
within a 250  250-mm field of view.
A computer outside the scanner room controlled
stimulus timing and response recording. Stimuli were
projected onto a screen at the back of the scanner bore
and viewed by subjects through a mirror mounted on
the head coil. Subject responses were transmitted by a
custom-designed fiber-optic response pad.

Data Analysis
Data analysis was performed with Voxbo software (www.
voxbo.org). After image reconstruction, functional time
series were sinc-interpolated in time to correct for staggered slice acquisition, realigned to the first image acquired for each subject by a six-parameter rigid-body
transformation, and thresholded to exclude extraparenchymal voxels from subsequent analyses. Within each
subject, a voxelwise analysis was performed with a modified version of the general linear model for serially
correlated error terms (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito,
1997; Zarahn, Aguirre, & D’Esposito, 1997; Worsley &
Friston, 1995). Included in this model were covariates
modeling different task conditions, a subject-specific estimate of the intrinsic temporal autocorrelation, and sine
and cosine regressors for frequencies below those of the
task (below 0.005 Hz for main analyses, below 0.0058–
9.0179 Hz for localizer analyses) and for frequencies
in the elevated range of the noise spectrum (above
0.1666 Hz). Task covariates were delta functions (main
analyses) or boxcar waveforms (localizer analyses) convolved with a subject- and task-specific estimate of the
hemodynamic response function (main scans) or a generic estimate empirically derived from the motor cortex
in a large group of subjects (localizer scans) (Aguirre,
Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 1998). Data from localizer scans
were also smoothed in space with an 8-mm full-width
half-maximum kernel and smoothed in time with the
hemodynamic response function. The subject- and taskspecific estimate of the hemodynamic response was derived from first scan of each subject (which involved
the first presentation of Old Person, Old Action movies

in a sparse, event-related manner) by averaging the
response across all trials in all significantly modulated
voxels.
From the localizer scans, we identified six ROIs in
accordance with previous studies (Hasson et al., 2003;
Downing et al., 2001; Grossman et al., 2000; Epstein &
Kanwisher, 1998; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Tootell et al.,
1995). ROIs were defined as contiguous voxels in a
particular region showing greater activity for a specific
contrast. FFA was defined based on the contrast of faces
versus objects, PPA on the contrast of places versus
faces and objects, LO on the contrast of objects versus
faces and places, EBA on the contrast of body parts versus objects, pSTS on the contrast of point-light motion
and random motion, and MT/MST on the contrast of
random motion and stationary dots. Because this localizer for MT/MST differed slightly from one we had
used previously (Kable, Kan, Wilson, Thompson-Schill, &
Chatterjee, 2005; Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, & Chatterjee,
2002), we confirmed in seven of the current subjects
that localizing MT/MST with moving and stationary rings
identified a largely identical region showing similar
effects to the one identified by the moving and stationary dots comparison. Because MT/MST, EBA, and
LO overlapped in some subjects, we also repeated the
analysis for voxels that were unique to each contrast
(e.g., in MT/MST but not EBA or LO), and the results
did not differ from the ones reported here for the full
ROIs.
Random-effects analyses were performed for each
ROI as follows. First, the fMRI time series was averaged
for all voxels within a defined ROI in each subject.
Except where noted in the results, this averaging occurred over all voxels in both hemispheres of an ROI.
Next, a measure of the effect of interest (based on beta
values for particular contrasts) was obtained from the
general linear model for the spatially averaged ROI time
series in each subject. Adaptation was quantified by
calculating an adaptation ratio: (bold
bnew)/(bold +
bnew). Finally, these effects for each subject were either
entered into a repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) or, in the case of planned direct comparisons,
paired t tests.
We also performed a whole-brain analysis as follows. For each individual subject, we derived unthresholded beta maps for the contrast of interest. Using a
12-parameter affine transformation with nonlinear deformations, we then normalized these maps into a standard coordinate space (MNI). We initially calculated
normalization parameters by using each subject’s highresolution anatomical scan. After normalization, we spatially smoothed the maps with a kernel with full-width
half-maximum of 8 mm. Finally, we conducted a random-effects analysis by testing whether the mean value
across subjects in each voxel was significantly different
from zero. For each contrast of interest, we used permutation methods to determine a cluster size threshold
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for voxels significant at p < .001 (two-tailed, uncorrected) that corresponded to a corrected significance
of p < .05 (Nichols & Holmes, 2002).
In our primary analysis, the voxelwise general linear
model included four task covariates, one for each of
the four different adaptation conditions, constructed by
convolving delta functions aligned to onset of each
movie with a subject- and task-specific estimate of the
hemodynamic response. We fit three other statistical
models in addition to the primary one. To test whether
the adaptation effects we observed depended on transi-

tivity, we fit a version of the primary model that split
each of the four covariates modeling the different adaptation conditions according to whether the action involved was transitive or intransitive, for a total of eight
covariates. To obtain the estimated responses presented
in Figure 4, we fit a model that used a Fourier basis
set (Ardekani & Kanno, 1998) to estimate the response
in each of the four adaptation conditions. This model
included seven covariates for each condition: one DC
(mean) component, three sine components of different frequencies, and three cosine components of differ-

Figure 4. Neural adaptation
effects in functional ROIs.
Neural adapation effects are
graphed for each condition in
(A) pSTS, (B) MT/MST, (C)
EBA, (D) LO, (E) FFA, and
(F ) PPA. Adaptation effects are
expressed as a ratio: (bold
bnew)/(bold + bnew). Error bars
represent the standard error of
the mean. Asterisks indicate an
effect is significant at p < .05.
All ROIs are bilateral.

1504

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

Volume 18, Number 9

Table 1. Behavioral Performance of fMRI Subjects

to estimate the delay to peak of the hemodynamic response for that condition.1

Reaction Time
(msec)

% Responses
< 2 sec

Old Person, Old Action

926 ± 70

99.3 ± 0.5

RESULTS

Old Person, New Action

1224 ± 62

95.8 ± 1.5

Behavioral Results

New Person, Old Action

1050 ± 68

98.6 ± 0.8

New Person, New Action

1186 ± 64

97.2 ± 1.0

During scanning, subjects performed a speeded judgment for each movie indicating how often they typically
see the action being performed (more/less than once a
week). Response data indicated that subjects reliably
performed the task. Subjects’ responses agreed with the
typical response (determined in a separate rating study)
in 84 ± 2% of cases, and were consistent (same response
given to different exemplars of the same action) in 90 ±
2% of cases.
Reaction time data from this task are reported in
Table 1. A repeated measures ANOVA indicated a significant effect of condition on reaction time, F(3,24) =
44.184, p < .0001. Subjects demonstrated a robust
repetition priming, as the Old Person, Old Action condition was significantly faster than all others (paired
t test, all ps < .0001). Subjects also demonstrated an
action-specific priming, with the New Person, Old Action
condition being significantly faster than either of the
New Action conditions (paired t test, both ps < .001). A
repeated measures ANOVA also indicated a significant
effect of condition on the percentage of responses
within the 2-sec time limit, F(3,24) = 5.021, p = .0077.
Specifically, subjects made more responses within the
2-sec time limit for the Old Person, Old Action condition compared to either of the New Action conditions
(paired t test, both ps <.05).

ent frequencies. The estimated response is then the
sum of these seven fitted covariates. This model is
an analog of a trial average, except in the frequency
domain rather than the time domain; a trial average
estimates the response at each point in time in the
trial, whereas the Fourier model estimates the components of the response at different frequencies. We
estimated the responses in each condition in this manner, rather than by calculating a trial average, because
the beginning of each trial was jittered with respect to
the image repetition time. To evaluate different potential mechanisms for the adaptation effects we observed,
we were interested in whether the hemodynamic response peaked at different times in the different adaptation conditions. Our primary model assumed that
the shape of the hemodynamic response, including the
delay to peak of the response, was the same in each
condition. Therefore, to address this question, we also
fit a model that allowed the delay to peak to vary
across conditions, based on the method developed by
Henson, Price, Rugg, Turner, and Friston (2002) and
Liao et al. (2002). This method involves fitting two
covariates for each condition; the first (the canonical
hemodynamic response) primarily fits the height of
the response, and the second (the first derivative of
the canonical hemodynamic response) primarily fits
the delay to peak of the response. The beta values associated with these two covariates can then be used

ROI Analyses
For our primary analysis, we functionally identified six
bilateral ROIs (see Figure 3). Table 2 provides information about the size of each ROI and the number of
subjects for whom we identified each ROI. Within each

Table 2. Properties of Functional ROIs
ROI Identified in
(Fraction of Subjects)

Includes Left
Hemisphere in
(Fraction of Subjects)

Size in Left
Hemisphere
(± SEM, Voxels)

Includes Right
Hemisphere in
(Fraction of Subjects)

Size in Right
Hemisphere
(± SEM, Voxels)

pSTS

9/9

6/9

43 ± 19

9/9

51 ± 14

MT/MST

9/9

9/9

40 ± 5

9/9

58 ± 5

EBA

9/9

7/9

38 ± 12

9/9

75 ± 11

LO

8/9

8/9

44 ± 15

3/9

30 ± 6

FFA

8/9

7/9

14 ± 4

8/9

32 ± 8

PPA

9/9

9/9

60 ± 16

9/9

83 ± 19
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subject, we averaged over all voxels in both hemispheres
within each ROI and fit a general linear model to the
spatially averaged time series. To test whether there
were any effects of adaptation condition across subjects,
the beta values from this model for each of the four
adaptation conditions were entered into a repeated
measures ANOVA with adaptation condition as a factor.
There was a significant effect of adaptation condition in
pSTS, F(3,24) = 10.476, p = .0001; MT/MST, F(3,24) =
7.264, p = .0012; EBA, F(3,24) = 5.967, p = .0034;
and LO, F(3,24) = 10.556, p = .0002, but not in FFA,
F(3,21) = 2.205, p = .11, or PPA, F(3,24) = 2.870,
p = .057. To quantify the different adaptation effects,
we calculated an adaptation ratio (AR) from the beta
values as (bold
bnew)/(bold + bnew). We calculated

three ratios for repetition adaptation (Old Person, Old
Action vs. New Person, New Action), action-specific
adaptation (New Person, Old Action vs. New Person,
New Action) and person-specific adaptation (Old Person, New Action vs. New Person, New Action).
In pSTS (Figures 4A and 5A), there was significant repetition adaptation, AR mean ± SE = .42 ± .17, t(8) =
2.547, p = .034, and significant action-specific adaptation, AR = .14 ± .04, t(8) = 3.753, p = .0056, but
no significant person-specific adaptation (AR = .00 ±
.04). In addition, action-specific adaptation was reliably
larger than person-specific adaptation in pSTS, t(8) =
3.512, p = .0079. Both MT/MST (Figures 4B and 5B)
and EBA (Figures 4C and 5C) showed significant repetition adaptation, MT/MST: AR = .12 ± .03, t(8) =

Figure 5. Estimated responses
in functional ROIs. Mean
estimated responses are
graphed for each adaptation
condition in: (A) pSTS, (B)
MT/MST, (C) EBA, (D) LO,
(E) FFA, and (F ) PPA. Error
bars represent the standard
error of the mean, across
subjects. Responses to each
adaptation condition were
estimated for an 18-sec
window for each subject
using an unbiased Fourier
basis set (sine and cosine
regressors at three frequencies
plus one DC component).
All ROIs are bilateral.
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4.258, p = .0028; EBA: AR = .12 ± .03, t(8) =
3.435, p = .0089, and significant action-specific adaptation, MT/MST: AR = .04 ± .01, t(8) = 4.070,
p = .0036; EBA: AR = .04 ± .01, t(8) = 3.155,
p = .014. However, although the person-specific adaptation effect did not reach significance in either MT/MST
or EBA, MT/MST: AR = .05 ± .04, t(8) = 1.156,
p = .28; EBA: AR = .03 ± .02, t(8) = 1.753, p = .12,
it was also not reliably different from the action-specific
effect (paired t test, both ps > .5). In LO (Figures 4D
and 5D), only the repetition adaptation effect reached
significance: repetition AR = .26 ± .07, t(7) = 3.721,
p = .0074. FFA (Figures 4E and 5E) showed a similar
pattern to LO, but the repetition adaptation effect failed
to reach significance: repetition AR = .08 ± .05, t(7) =
1.599, p = .15. In contrast, none of the adaptation
effects reached significance in PPA (Figures 4F and 5F)
(all ps > .10). Finally, these various patterns of effects
across the six ROIs were significantly different from
each other. In an ANOVA with ROI and adaptation effect as factors, there was a significant interaction between ROI and adaptation effect, F(10,60) = 2.365,
p = .0197.
As shown in Figure 1, half of the movies depicted
intransitive actions that only involved movements of the
body, whereas half depicted transitive actions that also
involved objects. To test whether the adaptation effects
we observed depended on transitivity, we fit an additional model that divided each of the four adaptation
conditions according to whether they contained a transitive or intransitive action. In ANOVAs with transitivity
and adaptation condition as factors, none of the ROIs
showed a significant transitivity by adaptation condition
interaction (F test, all ps > .10).
To test for hemispheric differences, we calculated adaptation ratios separately for the left- and right-hemispheric
components of each ROI. In ANOVAs with hemisphere
and adaptation effect as factors, none of the ROIs
showed a significant hemisphere by adaptation effect
interaction (F test, all ps > .10). Furthermore, a direct
comparison of action-specific adaptation across hemispheres did not reach significance in pSTS, MT/MST, or
EBA (paired t test, all ps > .10). However, although not
significant, there was a trend for action-specific adaptation to be more reliable in the right hemisphere, pSTS:
left AR = .02 ± .09, t(5) = .220, p = .83, right AR =
.21 ± .05, t(8) = 4.222, p = .0029; MT/MST: left AR =
.04 ± .03, t(8) = 1.687, p = .13, right AR = .04 ±
.02, t(8) = 2.612, p = .031; EBA: left AR = .01 ± .02,
t(6) = .499, p = .64, right AR = .05 ± .01, t(8) =
3.318, p = .0106.

Whole-brain Analysis
In addition to focused hypothesis testing in each ROI, we
also performed a whole-brain analysis to detect large

effects outside of these ROIs (see Figure 6 and Table 3).
The left lateral occipitotemporal cortex showed both significant repetition adaptation (Old Person, Old Action <
New Person, New Action), as well as action-specific adaptation (New Person, Old Action < New Person, New
Action). In all cases, there was a bilateral effect in lateral
occipitotemporal regions at slightly lower thresholds
(see Figure 6). We also observed repetition adaptation
bilaterally in the ventral occipitotemporal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex, and action-specific adaptation in the left ventral
prefrontal and bilateral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.
Person-specific adaptation (Old Person, New Action <
New Person, New Action) was seen in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex.

Is Neural Adaptation an Effect
of Behavioral Priming?
The neural adaptation effects we observed in pSTS, MT/
MST, and EBA largely correlated with the behavioral
priming effects seen in the frequency judgment task
(Old Person, Old Action < New Person, Old Action <
Old Person, New Action = New Person, New Action). We
expected such a correlation between neural activity (in
areas involved in action recognition) and behavior (reaction time in the frequency judgment task) given that
both measures should reflect improved efficiency of
action recognition with repeated stimuli. However, one
could argue that neural adaptation is an epiphenomenon of behavioral priming, simply reflecting a global
‘‘shutting down’’ of activity as subjects finish the task
more quickly (Henson, 2003). The specificity in location
of action-specific adaptation argues against this time-ontask account, which would predict widespread effects in
all brain regions engaged by the stimuli. However, we
performed an additional analysis to disconfirm this timeon-task account. This account, as well as some of the
other proposed mechanisms for adaptation (Henson,
2003), predicts that the response peak should occur
sooner in adapted conditions because adaptation would
be caused by a decrease in the duration of neural
activity. We tested whether the adaptation effects we
observed were accompanied by a temporal shift in
the response peak, using the method developed by
Henson et al. (2002) and Liao et al. (2002) (see Methods). A significant shift in the peak response accompanied repetition adaptation (Old Person, Old Action vs.
New Person, New Action) in MT/MST, t(8) = 7.062,
p = .0001), EBA (t(8) = 5.874, p = .0004) and FFA
(t(7) = 2.872, p = .024. Intriguingly, in all three cases,
the size of this shift was similar to the 260-msec behavioral priming effect seen for the Old Person, Old Action condition (241 ± 34 msec in MT/MST, 223 ± 38
in EBA, and 285 ± 99 in FFA). Such a significant shift
for the repetition effect was not found in pSTS, LOC,
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Figure 6. Neural adaptation effects across the whole brain. Displayed are the results of a whole-brain analysis for three contrasts: (A) Old
Person, Old Action < New Person, New Action (repetition effect); (B) New Person, Old Action < New Person, New Action (action-specific
effect); and (C) Old Person, New Action < New Person, New Action (person-specific effect). Activations are overlaid on the average of each
subject’s normalized brain. The color gradient goes from p < .01 to p < .001 (both two-tailed, uncorrected).

or PPA (paired t test, all ps > .10). More importantly,
no significant shift was found in any ROI for the actionspecific or person-specific effects (paired t test, all
ps > .30).

DISCUSSION
We used repetition-related decreases in neural activity to
probe the neural bases of action recognition. We found
that pSTS, MT/MST, and EBA showed adaptation for
stimuli in which the action was repeated but the person
involved was not. Although previous studies have found
increased activity in these regions when people see
actions, our findings demonstrate that these three areas
are sensitive to the particular action seen because the
identity of the action alone (whether someone is dribbling or kicking) distinguishes repeated from novel

1508

Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

actions. Such action-specific adaptation cannot be explained by sensitivity of these areas simply to the presence of motion or the human form. Thus, these results
provide compelling evidence that these areas within
the lateral occipitotemporal cortex play a critical role
in action recognition.
Action recognition likely includes multiple stages,
from the perceptual categorization of complex motion
patterns to the conceptual understanding of the goal of
an action or the intention of the agent (e.g., see the
recent model in Giese & Poggio, 2003). Based on the
known physiology of these regions ( Jellema, Baker,
Wicker, & Perrett, 2000; Andersen, 1997; Perrett et al.,
1989), we suggest that adaptation in pSTS reflects action
specificity at a more conceptual stage—involving similarities of goals or intentions across different exemplars
of particular actions—whereas adaptation in MT/MST
reflects action specificity in perceptual processing—
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Table 3. Location of Significant Activations in Whole-brain Analysis
Anatomical Location of Cluster

MNI Coordinates of Peak Voxel

Peak Voxel (z Value)

Cluster Size ( Voxels)

Repetition adaptation (Old Person, Old Action < New Person, New Action)
L. ventral temporal
Midbrain

39,

39,

18

3.86

11

0,

21,

9

3.97

7

R. medial prefrontal

15, 15, 3

4.26

19

R. ventral occipital

21,

60, 9

3.67

8

L. lateral occipitotemporal

54,

72, 12

4.31

31

R. medial prefrontal

12, 24, 33

3.64

8

R. dorsolateral prefrontal

51, 15, 42

3.69

10

L. dorsolateral prefrontal

24, 9, 51

4.16

12

3.73

15

4.71

48

4.51

16

L. medial prefrontal

6, 18, 54

Action-specific adaptation (New Person, Old Action < New Person, New Action)
L. ventral prefrontal

45, 18,

L. lateral occipitotemporal

48,

3

54, 12

R. medial prefrontal

9, 27, 27

3.80

11

L. medial prefrontal

9, 36, 30

3.58

11

L. medial prefrontal

6, 18, 54

4.09

17

3.81

13

Person-specific adaptation (Old Person, New Action < New Person, New Action)
Ventromedial prefrontal

0, 24,

15

All activations significant at a cluster size threshold of p < .05 are reported. Permutation methods were used to determine a significant cluster size
for voxels with p < .001 (two-tailed, uncorrected). This threshold was seven to nine voxels, depending on the contrast. L = left; R = right.

involving similarities in the motion patterns across different exemplars. Because the current experiment involved the activation of these representations during
visual perception, we consider it an open question
whether the same action-specific representations are
also activated during motor planning (as suggested by
the mirror neuron hypothesis; see Rizzolatti et al., 2001).
pSTS showed the greatest sensitivity and selectivity for
repeated actions. The proportional decrease was largest
in pSTS, and the action-specific effect in pSTS was
reliably larger than the person-specific effect. Previous
studies have shown that regions of the superior temporal sulcus show greater activity for moving compared to
stationary bodies, for point-light biological motion compared to random-dot motion, or for moving bodies
compared to moving objects (Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby,
& Martin, 2002; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Allison et al., 2000;
Grossman et al., 2000; Decety & Grezes, 1999; Bonda
et al., 1996; Howard et al., 1996). These findings could
potentially be explained by the presence of biological
motion or by the joint presence of motion and a biological form. Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, and Kanwisher

(2004) found differences in activity in the superior temporal sulcus between conditions that were matched
on the precise pattern of visible motion and concluded
that this region responds to the perception of intentional action rather than biological motion alone. Our
finding that pSTS shows action-specific adaptation demonstrates that neural activity in this region is not only
sensitive to biological motion or intentional actions, but
also distinguishes between different particular actions.
Consistent with the idea that pSTS harbors conceptual
representations of particular actions, this region also
shows greater activity for action words (Kable et al.,
2002, 2005), and lesions in this area impair conceptual
knowledge about actions (Tranel, Kemmerer, Adolphs,
Damasio, & Damasio, 2003).
Although the effect was smaller, we also observed
action-specific adaptation in MT/MST. Although MT/
MST’s role in motion processing is well known, the
action-specific adaptation we report cannot be explained
merely by the presence of motion because all of the
movies contained motion. Nor can this effect be explained by repetition of the same exact pattern of
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motion because different people naturally perform the
same action in different manners. Nor can this effect be
explained by repetition of a simple component of the
motion pattern, such as overall direction, because in our
stimuli the overall direction of motion does not distinguish between different actions (rightward motion does
not distinguish between walking, marching, crawling,
skipping, jumping, rolling, or cartwheeling). Rather,
action-specific adaptation is best explained by similarities between different exemplars in a higher dimensional
space that incorporates multiple components of the
motion pattern. To our knowledge, this is the first
demonstration that motion processing within MT/MST
differentiates between particular actions. This sensitivity
might explain activation in human MT/MST for static
pictures of actions (Kable et al., 2002; Damasio et al.,
2001; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000).
EBA also exhibited action-specific adaptation. Although less is known about the response properties of
this region, the initial report characterizing EBA hypothesized that it might be involved in the recognition of
actions performed by human bodies (Downing et al.,
2001). The finding that the EBA shows adaptation for
repeated actions establishes that this region participates
in action recognition, perhaps through an analysis of the
body postures involved in different actions.
The pSTS, MT/MST, and EBA ROIs were all bilateral,
and thus included voxels in both hemispheres in most
subjects (Table 2). Action recognition impairments have
been associated with left-hemisphere damage (Gainotti
& Lemmo, 1976). In contrast, fMRI studies have generally found bilateral or right-lateralized activity when subjects view actions (Saxe et al., 2004; Kable et al., 2002;
Grossman et al., 2000). We did not find conclusive evidence for hemispheric differences in action-specific
adaptation. The pSTS, MT/MST, and EBA ROIs generally included more voxels from the right hemisphere
(Table 2), and an analysis dividing these ROIs by hemisphere found a trend for greater action-specific adaptation in the right hemisphere. However, in the whole
brain analysis, action-specific adaptation was stronger
in the left lateral occipitotemporal cortex (Table 3 and
Figure 6).
Our finding that some brain regions contain action
representations that are abstracted away from the agents
involved has important implications for cognitive development. Children consistently learn verbs after nouns,
and the action referent for a verb is far less transparent
than the object referent for a noun. Mandler (2004)
suggests that the ability to abstract actions from the
specific details of the individual objects involved may be
required before a spatial event can be mapped onto
language. Similarly, Gentner (2003) suggests that the recognition of actions as distinct from the agent is a central feature of ‘‘why we’re so smart,’’ allowing a cognitive
shift from conceptualizing concrete perceptual objects
to conceptualizing more abstract relations among ob-
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jects. The lateral occipitotemporal region containing
pSTS, MT/MST, and EBA is well situated to integrate
auditory input with motion information and social cues
to establish verbal labels for actions. In addition, the
lateral temporal cortex is one of the regions that matures last in the developing brain (Gogtay et al., 2004),
suggesting that this region is engaged in relatively complex aspects of perceptual cognition.

Other Brain Regions
In contrast to our findings in pSTS, MT/MST, and EBA,
we did not find action-specific or person-specific adaptation in LO, PPA, or FFA. We did find repetition adaptation in LO and a significantly earlier time to peak in FFA
for the repetition condition. Because the action clips
contain both people and objects, such repetition effects
are consistent with previous findings of adaptation for
faces or objects in the fusiform gyrus and LO ( James
et al., 2002; Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Koutstaal et al., 2001;
Grill-Spector et al., 1999). Given FFA’s role in face recognition, one might have expected person-specific adaptation in this area. However, in our stimuli, the whole body
was visible and moving, so cues other than the face may
have been more important in identifying the person.
We did, however, detect person-specific adaptation in
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in the whole-brain
analysis. Our ability to detect such person-specific effects
in at least one region strengthens the specificity of the
action-specific effects we found in other regions. Personspecific activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
may reflect conceptual representations of individual
people, as this region also shows greater activity when
subjects name people compared to animals or tools
(Damasio, Tranel, Grabowski, Adolphs, & Damasio,
2004), and damage to this area produces profound
deficits in social interaction (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985).
In the whole-brain analysis, we also detected actionspecific adaptation in the ventrolateral and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex. Previous studies of the mirror neuron
system in humans and monkeys have suggested a role
for the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex in action recognition (Rizzolatti et al., 2001), and the action-specific
responses we report are consistent with this role. However, we should also note that there are alternative
explanations of these effects in terms of motor planning.
Because the same action entailed the same motor response in our task, the effects in the ventrolateral and
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex could reflect adaptation
related to the selection or preparation of the taskrelated motor response (Dobbins et al., 2004). A related
possibility is that subjects could have reflexively prepared the same action they were viewing, and the effects in the ventrolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex reflect adaptation of this task-unrelated motor
planning.
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Perhaps surprisingly, the whole-brain analysis did not
reveal action-specific adaptation in the inferior parietal
cortex. Many previous studies have associated action
recognition or action knowledge impairments with damage to the left inferior parietal cortex (Tranel et al., 2003;
Varney & Damasio, 1987; Ferro, Martins, Mariano, &
Caldas, 1983; Heilman, Rothi, & Valenstein, 1982). Although the role of the inferior parietal cortex is emphasized in these discussions, it should be noted that most
impaired patients also have damage to the posterior
superior and middle temporal gyrus ( Varney & Damasio,
1987; Ferro et al., 1983; Heilman et al., 1982). However,
even if the critical region for action recognition impairments is the inferior parietal cortex, there are three
possible reasons why we did not see action-specific
adaptation there. First, adaptation would not be seen
if the critical role played by the inferior parietal cortex
was similar for all actions and thus not action specific—
for example, a general role of spatial and temporal
processing in perceiving sequential movements. Second, the actions we studied did not focus on grasping
and reaching, as is common in apraxia studies. A recent study that did find action-specific activity in the
inferior parietal cortex (Shmuelof & Zohary, 2005) used
actions involving different kinds of grasping motions,
with only the hand and forearm of the actor visible. In
contrast, the actions in our experiment mostly involved
the whole body, and the agent’s whole body was visible.
Third, the inferior parietal cortex may specifically instantiate knowledge of the mechanical advantages afforded
by tools, a knowledge domain not emphasized in our
experiment.
Alternative Explanations for Adaptation Effects
In general, our conclusions are consistent with several
proposed neuronal mechanisms for fMRI adaptation,
such as decreased firing of all neurons responsive to the
stimulus (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001), the formation
of sparser representations using fewer neurons (Wiggs
& Martin, 1998), or more efficient access of preexisting
representations (Henson, 2003). However, there are two
other explanations for adaptation, based on attentional
effects, which should be considered. Because these explanations undercut the logic of adaptation designs, they
are a concern for all studies using this technique.
One alternative explanation is that adaptation is an
attentional by-product of behavioral priming (Henson,
2003). The signal decreases we observed might reflect a
decreased duration of neural activity simply because
brain regions engaged by the stimuli shut down as the
subject finishes the task earlier. For two reasons, such a
time-on-task explanation could not account for actionspecific adaptation in pSTS, MT/MST, and EBA. First, the
pattern of adaptation differed significantly across the
ROIs we examined, indicating that action-specific adaptation was not a general effect observed in all active

regions. Similarly, in the whole-brain analysis, we failed
to observe action-specific adaptation in many regions—
such as the primary visual cortex—that were active
during the action movies. Second, the time-on-task
explanation is predicated on signal decreases from a
decreased duration of neural activity, which would have
an earlier hemodynamic response peak. However, we
detected no significant change in the time to peak
associated with action-specific adaptation.
A related but distinct explanation is that adaptation directly reflects nonspecific attentional processing. pSTS,
MT/MST, and EBA might be involved in the general
deployment of attention, and thus show decreased
activity during those conditions that subjects finish more
quickly. However, such an attentional explanation is
not consistent with previous findings because it predicts
that pSTS, MT/MST, and EBA should show adaptation
for any condition associated with behavioral priming.
When subjects attend to object identity, they exhibit
behavioral priming for different views or different exemplars of previously seen objects, yet lateral occipitotemporal areas do not exhibit object-specific adaptation
under these circumstances. Rather, object-specific adaptation is observed in the ventral occipitotemporal cortex
( James et al., 2002; Vuilleumier et al., 2002; Koutstaal
et al., 2001).

Conclusion
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that three areas
within the lateral occipitotemporal cortex—pSTS, MT/
MST, and EBA—are involved in action recognition, and
that the sensitivity of these areas is more complex than
hitherto considered. Given that actions involve changes
in the relationship between objects in space, it is not
surprising that these areas are located in an intermediate position on the cortical surface between more
dorsal parietal areas involved in spatial processing and
more ventral occipitotemporal areas involved in object recognition. Consistent with anatomical evidence
(Boussaoud, Ungerleider, & Desimone, 1990), these results suggest the existence of a ‘‘ventrodorsal’’ or ‘‘lateral’’ stream of visual processing, including the classical
dorsal stream areas MT and MST, which is important
for action recognition.

Appendix
Example of the actions and persons used as stimuli are
provided. Each of the 48 different actions and 48 different people are represented, and the examples are
categorized according to whether the action was transitive/intransitive and common/uncommon. Only a single
frame from the full movie is shown. While these frames
are shown in grayscale, the movie were presented to the
subjects in color.
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Note
1. In the place of the canonical hemodynamic response and
its first derivative, we used the first and second eigenvectors
from an analysis of the variability in hemodynamic responses in
a large group of subjects (Aguirre et al., 1998). The first
eigenvector is similar in shape to the canonical hemodynamic
response, and the second eigenvector primarily shifts this
response in time, just like the first derivative. This necessitated
using a slightly different formula from the one provided by
Henson et al. (2002) to calculate the time to peak of the
response. The formula used was: peak (sec) = 2.2295 (2 
2.2295)/(1 + e1.7737  b(second eigenvector)/b(first eigenvector)).
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